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Abstract
Along with substantial progress made recently in designing near-optimal mechanisms for multi-
item auctions, interesting structural questions have also been raised and studied. In particular, is
it true that the seller can always extract more revenue from a market where the buyers value the
items higher than another market? In this paper we obtain such a revenue monotonicity result in a
general setting. Precisely, consider the revenue-maximizing combinatorial auction for m items and
n buyers in the Bayesian setting, specified by a valuation function v and a set F of nm independent
item-type distributions. Let REV (v, F ) denote the maximum revenue achievable under F by any
incentive compatible mechanism. Intuitively, one would expect that REV (v,G) ≥ REV (v, F ) if
distribution G stochastically dominates F . Surprisingly, Hart and Reny (2012) showed that this is
not always true even for the simple case when v is additive. A natural question arises: Are these
deviations contained within bounds? To what extent may the monotonicity intuition still be valid?
We present an approximate monotonicity theorem for the class of fractionally subadditive (XOS)
valuation functions v, showing that REV (v,G) ≥ cREV (v, F ) if G stochastically dominates F
under v where c > 0 is a universal constant. Previously, approximate monotonicity was known only
for the case n = 1: Babaioff et al. (2014) for the class of additive valuations, and Rubinstein and
Weinberg (2015) for all subaddtive valuation functions.
∗Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing.
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1 Introduction
Along with substantial progress made recently in designing near-optimal mechanisms for multi-item
auctions, interesting structural questions have also been raised and studied. In particular, is it true
that the seller can always extract more revenue from a market where the buyers value the items higher
than another market? In this paper we obtain such a revenue monotonicity result in a general setting,
leveraging on recent progress made in the mechanism design literature.
In the simplest case of Myerson’s 1-item auction [13], let REV (F) denote the optimal revenue for
independent valuation distributions F = F1 × · · · × Fn. Is it true that REV (G) ≥ REV (F) when
G = G1 × · · · ×Gn stochastically dominates F (i.e. Gi stochastically dominates Fi for each buyer i)?
Intuitively, if each buyer i is prepared to pay more for the item, it seems reasonable that the seller
should be able to extract more revenue. This is indeed true for the 1-item auctions, as remarked in
Rubinstein and Weinberg [14], as a consequence of Myerson’s characterization.
The revenue monotonicity question becomes much subtler when there are m > 1 items in the
auction. Hart and Reny [10] showed that revenue monotonicity is not universally true even with just
one buyer (n = 1) and two items (m = 2). They gave examples with distributions G stochastically
dominating F , yet REV (G) < REV (F). Thus, when there are m > 1 items, the target can only be
approximate revenue monotonicity, e.g. REV (G) ≥ cREV (F) for some absolute positive constant c.
The following monotonicity results have been shown for n = 1 buyer and any number of items:
if G stochastically dominates F , then REV (G) ≥ 16REV (F) when the valuation function is additive
(Babaioff et al. [1]), and REV (G) ≥ 1338REV (F) for combinatorial auctions with any subadditive
valuations (Rubinstein and Weinberg [14]). These results were obtained as immediate corollaries of
their respective near-optimal mechanisms which are revenue monotone in distributions. Recently, near-
optimal mechanism were found for any n,m in Yao [15] and Cai, Devanur and Weinberg [2] for additive
valuations, and in Cai and Zhao [3] (also Feldman, Gravin and Lucier [7] for welfare maximization)
for XOS valuation functions. However, these mechanisms are not obviously revenue monotone in
distributions; as such, no general monotonicity results are known for n > 1.
Our main result is to resolve this question in the affirmative for the class of XOS valuation functions.
For any m,n, and combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations v, we show that REV (G) ≥ cREV (F)
for c = 11448 if G stochastically dominates F with respect to v. We also prove two auxiliary theorems
which are needed in proving our main result, and also useful in their own right. Firstly, for any single-
parameter environment auction A ⊆ [0, 1]n, we show that the optimal revenue satisfies REVA(G) ≥
REVA(F) if G stochastically dominates F . This implies that revenue monotonicity is true not just for
Myerson’s 1-item optimal auctions, but also for general 1-dimensional auction problems in which the
allocation vectors are restricted to an arbitrary allowable set of patterns. Secondly, as a consequence
of the single-parameter monotonicity above, we infer that REV (G) ≥ 124REV (F) in the unit-demand
multi-item auctions.
Contributions of this work: 1) We have given answers of great generality to the revenue mono-
tonicity question, applicable to all XOS subadditive valuation functions, while previously little was
known even for the additive valuations. 2) Our key innovation in proof technique is a conceptual one
(see Section 4.2), requiring no complicated calculations or analysis. A main difficulty in proving XOS
monotonicity is the fact that the near-optimal mechanism given in [3] is not monotone. To overcome
this obstacle, we first embed our auction into a more relaxed context (that of digital goods). In this
larger space, we can then establish revenue monotonicity via a connecting path (in the new space)
2
between the two embedded distributions. 3) At a more philosophical level, we agree with the sentiment
(such as expressed in Hart and Nisan [9]) that the goal of designing mechanisms is not only to produce
an algorithm that works, but also to reveal mathematical structures that allow interesting questions
such as revenue monotonicity to be answered. Our present work serves as another validation of the
fruitfulness of this approach.
2 Main Results
We present results in three standard auction models in the independent setting, in which all the mn
item-types are drawn from independent distributions. Some familiar terminologies are reviewed below.
For any two random variables X,Y , we write X ≃ Y if X and Y are equal in distribution, i.e.,
Pr{X ∈ S} = Pr{Y ∈ S} for any measurable set S. Let F , G be distributions over [0,∞). We write
F  G if F is (stochastically) dominated by G (i.e. Pr{F > t} ≤ Pr{G > t} for all t ∈ [0,∞)).
Equivalently, we may write G  F if G dominates F . Let F = F1 × · · · × Fn and G = G1 × · · · × Gn
be product distributions over [0,∞)n. We say F  G (or equivalently G  F) if Fi  Gi for each i.
Let M = (x, p) be an n-buyer DIC-IR mechanism, and let F be an input valuation distribution
over [0,∞)n. Let XM,F and PM,F stand for the random variables XM,F = x(t), PM,F = p(t) in the
probability space {t| t ∼ F}.
A randomized DIC-IR mechanism is a family of mechanisms {M r| r ∼ H}, where each M r =
(xr, pr) is a DIC-IR mechanism, and r is randomly chosen according to some distribution H. Let
xr = (xr1, . . . , x
r
n), p
r = (pr1, . . . , p
r
n). The revenue yielded by M
R under input distribution F is
defined as MR(F) =
∑n
i=1Er∼H, t∼F (p
r
i (t)). Let XMR,F and PMR,F stand for the random variables
XMR,F = x
r(t), PMR,F = p
r(t) in the probability space {(r, t)| r ∼ H, t ∼ F}.
A single-parameter environment (see e.g. Gonczarowski and Nisan [8]) is specified by a set of
possible outcomes A ⊆ [0, 1]n. For a valuation distribution F over [0,∞)n, REVA(F) is defined as the
maximum revenue yielded by any DIC-IR mechanism, where the allocation x(t) for any type profile t
is restricted to be in the set A.
Theorem 1 [Single-Parameter Environment] Let M = (x, p) with allocation function x and pay-
ment function p be an n-player DIC-IR mechanism with valuation distribution F over [0,∞)n. Let
XM,F , PM,F denote the random variables corresponding to x, p. Then for any valuation distribution
G  F , there exists a randomized DIC-IR mechanism MR such that
(A) (XMR,G , PMR,G) ≃ {(x(t), pG(t)) | t ∼ F} where pG : [0,∞)
n → [0,∞)n and pG ≥ p.
(B) XMR,G ≃ XM,F , and M
R(G) ≥M(F).
Corollary For any single-parameter environment A, we have REVA(G) ≥ REVA(F) if G  F .
Theorem 1 can be used to prove a monotonicity theorem for unit-demand multi-item auctions.
Let DREV UD(F) denote the optimal revenue achievable by any deterministic DIC-IR mechanism for
distribution F in the unit-demand model, and let REV UD(F) be the optimal revenue achievable by
any incentive-compatible mechanism allowing randomized lotteries. It is known (Chawla, Malec and
Sivan [5]) that allowing lotteries sometimes can generate more revenues.
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Theorem 2 [Unit-Demand Multi-item Auction] If G  F , then
DREV UD(G) ≥ max{
1
6
DREV UD(F),
1
24
REV UD(F)}.
Theorem 2 is useful in the proof of the next theorem, which is the main result of this paper. Let
v = (v1, · · · , vn) be a valuation function, and each vi has αv(≥ 1)-supporting prices for all ti (see Section
5 for definitions). It is known that αv = 1 if v is fractionally subadditive (XOS), and more generally
αv = O(logm) if v is subadditive. Let D and D
′ be distributions over some type space. We say that D
v-stochastically dominates D′ if a coupled random pair (t, t′) can be generated such that the marginal
distributions satisfy t ∼ D, t′ ∼ D′ and v(t, S) ≥ v(t′, S) for all S ⊆ [m].
In the next theorem, REVDIC(v,G) refers to the maximum revenue achievable by any deterministic
DIC-IR mechanism under valuation v and distribution G; REVBIC(v,F) refers to the maximum revenue
achievable by any randomized BIC-BIR mechanism under valuation v and distribution F .
Theorem 3 [Subadditive Combinatorial Auction] Let v be a valuation satisfying monotonicity, sub-
additivity and with no externalities. If G v F , then for any 0 < b < 1 we have
REVDIC(v,G) ≥
1
λ
REVBIC(v,F)
where λ = 32αv + 6
(
12 + 81−b + αv(
16
b(1−b) +
96
1−b )
)
.
Corollary If v is XOS, then αv = 1 and choosing b =
1
4 gives
REVDIC(v,G) ≥
1
1448
REVBIC(v,F).
Theorem 1 is easy to prove for the special case when all the distributions Fi, Gi over [0,∞) are
continuous and strictly increasing, using Myerson’s theory. The general case needs greater care, due to
discontinuities and plateaus of the distributions. We omit the proof here.
We prove Theorems 2 and 3 in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. More background information and
discussions will be presented along the way in proving these results.
3 Unit-Demand Auctions
Consider revenue maximization in an auction with m heterogenous items to sell, and n buyers who
are unit-demand, i.e., each buyer is allocated either 0 or 1 item. Buyer i has for item j valuation
distribution Fij over [0,∞), and all Fij are independent. Thus a deterministic mechanism M = (x, p)
satisfies
xij(t) ∈ {0, 1} and
∑
ℓ∈[m]
xiℓ(t) ≤ 1,
∑
ℓ∈[n]
xℓj(t) ≤ 1 for all i, j. (1)
Let DREV (UD)(F) be the maximum revenue achievable under F by any deterministic DIC-IR mecha-
nism. Let REV (UD)(F) denote the maximum revenue achievable under F by any randomized BIC-BIR
mechanism (equivalent to incentive-compatible lottery-based mechanisms [5]).
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An interesting connection was established in Chawla et al. [4][5] between unit-demand auctions
and single-parameter environment auctions. A unit-demand auction with valuation distribution F
induces a single-parameter auction OPTCOPIES−UD for nm buyers Bij with independent valuation
distributions Fij , satisfying the same allocation constraints as Eq. 1. Let OPT
COPIES−UD(F) denote
the maximum revenue achievable under F .
Theorem A (Chawla et al.[4], Kleinberg and Weinberg [12])
DREV UD(F) ≤ OPTCOPIES−UD(F) ≤ 6 ·DREV UD(F).
The upper bound 6 ·DREV UD(F) in Theorem A is accomplished by certain sequential posted-price
mechanism.
Theorem B (Chawla, Malec and Sivan [5], Cai, Devanur and Weinberg [2])
REV UD(F) ≤ 4 ·OPTCOPIES−UD(F).
Proof of Theorem 2. From Theorem A and B, we have
DREV UD(G) ≥
1
6
OPTCOPIES−UD(G),
OPTCOPIES−UD(F) ≥ max{DREV UD(F),
1
4
REV UD(F)}
Now, OPTCOPIES−UD is a single-parameter environment auction , and thus by Theorem 1,
OPTCOPIES−UD(G) ≥ OPTCOPIES−UD(F).
Theorem 2 follows from all the above inequalities.
4 Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions
4.1 Background
We consider revenue maximization in the combinatorial auction with n independent buyers and m
heterogeneous items. The auction is specified by a type profile distribution F and valuation function v
as elaborated below. We follow the convention used in [3][14].
For each i ∈ [n], buyer i receives a type ti = (ti1, · · · , tim), where ti is drawn from a product
distribution Fi = Fi1× · · · ×Fim over some type space Ti = Ti1× · · · × Tim. Let F = F1× · · · ×Fn and
t = (t1, · · · , tm). Let T = T1 × · · · × Tn. We also regard the type profile t ∈ T as as an n×m matrix
t = (tij), and F = (Fij) as an n×m matrix of independent distributions. For each i ∈ [n], buyer i has
a valuation function vi : Ti× 2
[m] → [0,∞). The quantity vi(ti, S) expresses the value buyer i attaches
to the collection of items S ⊆ [m] if ti is buyer i’s received type. Let v = (v1, · · · , vn).
A deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) specifies the allocation x = (x1, · · · , xn) and payment
p = (p1, · · · , pn), where xi : T → 2
[m] and pi : T → [0,∞), satisfying the condition that no item can be
allocated to more than 1 buyer. A randomized mechanism is specified by a distribution over the set of
5
deterministic mechanisms. Let REVDIC(v,F) and REVBIC(v,F) be the maximum achievable revenue
of any deterministic DIC-IR mechanism, and any randomized BIC-BIR mechanism, respectively.
We are interested in valuation function vi that have the following properties:
(1) No Extenalities: For each ti ∈ Ti and S ⊆ [m], vi(ti, S) depends only on (tij | j ∈ S).
(2) Monotone: For each ti ∈ Ti and U ⊆ V ⊆ [m], vi(ti, U) ≤ vi(ti, V ).
(3) Subadditive: For each ti ∈ Ti and U ⊆ V ⊆ [m], vi(ti, U ∪ V ) ≤ vi(ti, U) + vi(ti, V ).
We are particularly interested in valuations vi that are XOS (or called fractionally subadditive).
Namely, vi(ti, S) = maxk∈[K] v
(k)
i (ti, S) whereK is finite for each k and v
(k)
i (ti, ·) is an additive function,
i.e., v
(k)
i (ti, S) =
∑
j∈S v
(k)
i (ti, {j}) for all S ⊆ [m].
In Rubinstein and Weinberg [14], it was shown that, in the case of 1 buyer (n = 1), for any
subadditive valuation and F , there is a simple mechanism achieving a constant approximation of
optimal revenue. It was also shown in Cai and Zhao [3] that for any n, F , and XOS valuation v, there
exist certain sequential posted price mechanisms that achieve a constant approximation of optimal
revenue. We review below some fact from [3] that are essential for our proof of Theorem 3.
Definition Rational Sequential Posted Price Mechanism (RSPM)
Let ξ = (ξij) where ξij ≥ 0 is a posted price for buyer i and item j. Let p = (pij) where pij ≥ 0 is
payment of buyer i if item j is chosen. For i = 1 to n, buyer i picks at most 1 item j from the set S of
available items, maximizing buyer i’s utility Vij−ξij (where Vij = vi(ti, {j})) is a function of tij); buyer
i pays pij if j is picked, and pays 0 if no item is picked. We use RSPMξ to denote this mechanism.
Definition Anonymous Sequential Posted Price with Entry Fee Mechanism (ASPE)
This mechanism is specified by Q = (Q1, · · · , Qm), δ = (δ1, · · · , δn), where for each j ∈ [m], Qj is
posted price for item j, and for each i ∈ [n], δi(ti, S) is the entry fee paid by buyer i with reported
type ti when the set of available items is S ⊆ [m]. The mechanism proceeds as follows. For i = 1 to
n, buyer i either picks no item (and pays 0), or picks a subset I from the set S ⊆ [m] of still available
items and pays δi(ti, S) +
∑
j∈I Qj; we update S. The chosen subset I is determined by maximizing
buyer i’s utility v(ti, I) − (δi(ti, S) +
∑
j∈I Qj) among all I ⊆ S; ties are broken arbitrarily. We use
ASPEQ,δ to denote this mechanism.
Definition Supporting Price (Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira [6])
For any α ≥ 1, a type ti and a subset S ⊆ [m], prices (pj| j ∈ S) are α-supporting prices for vi(ti, S) if
(1) vi(ti, S
′) ≥
∑
j∈S′ pj for all S
′ ⊆ S, and
(2)
∑
j∈S pj ≥
1
α
vi(ti, S).
Definition Given any valuation v, let αv be such that for all i, ti and S, there exist αv-supporting
prices for vi(ti, S). Clearly, for XOS valuations vi, we can take αv = 1. It is also known that for any
subadditive valuations v, we can take αv = O(logm).
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Theorem D (Cai and Zhao [3]) For any v,F and constant b ∈ (0, 1), there exist ξ,Q, δ such that
REVBIC(v,F) ≤ (12 +
8
1− b
)RSPMξ(v,F) + 8αv
∑
j∈[m]
Qj ,
ASPEQ,δ(v,F) ≥
1
4
∑
j∈[m]
Qj − C · RSPMξ(v,F).
where C = 52(1−b) +
b+1
2b(1−b) .
4.2 Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, our plan is to prove the following two lemmas for the {ξ,Q, δ} satisfying Theorem
D above. As REVDIC(v,G) ≥ ASPEQ,δ(v,G), these lemmas together with Theorem D immediately
imply Theorem 3.
Lemma 1 If G v F , then RSPMξ(v,F) ≤ 6REVDIC(v,G).
Lemma 2 If G v F , then ASPEQ,δ(G) ≥
1
4
∑
j∈[m]Qj − C · RSPMξ(v,F).
Proof of Lemma 1. First we observe that RSPMξ (under v,F) can be regarded as a mechanism for
a standard unit-demand auction where buyer i has valuation yij ∈ [0,∞) with distribution Yij =
{yij = vi(ti, {j}) | ti ∼ Fi}. Let Fv denote the product distribution of all Yij. It is easy to see that
RSPMξ(v,F) ≤ DREV
(UD)(Fv). Now, as G v F , we have Gv  Fv. By Theorem 2, we have
DREV (UD)(Fv) ≤ 6DREV
(UD)(Gv) ≤ 6REVDIC(v,G).
Lemma 1 follows immediately.
The rest of Section 4 is denoted to the proof of Lemma 2. We first define some notations related
to the operations of ASPEQ,δ. For any i ∈ [n] and type profile t, let t<i = (t1, . . . , ti−1) and denote
by Si(t<i) the available set of items (i.e., not purchased by buyers 1, . . . , i − 1) for buyer i to choose
from. For any ti and I ⊆ [m], let ui(ti, I) = maxI′⊆I(v(ti, I
′)−
∑
j∈I′ Qj). By definition of ASPEQ,δ,
if ui(ti, I) < δi(I) where I = Si(t<i), then buyer i receives no item and pays 0; if ui(ti, I) ≥ δi(I),
buyer i receives a bundle I ′ ⊆ I maximizing v(ti, I
′) −
∑
j∈I′ Qj and pays δi(I) +
∑
j∈I′ Qj (regarded
as entry fee δi(I) plus item price
∑
j∈I′ Qj). Let SOLD(t) denote the set of items not picked by any
buyer after ASPEQ,δ is finished.
For any distribution G, the revenue ASPEQ,δ(G) consists of two parts: EntryFee(G) and ItemPrice(G)
which are the expected value of entry fees and item prices, respectively, paid by all buyers.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 2. We show that
EntryFee(G) ≥
1
4
∑
j∈[m]
Prt′∼G{j 6∈ SOLD(t
′)} ·Qj − C ·RSPMξ(v,F) (2)
ItemPrice(G) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
Prt′∼G{j ∈ SOLD(t
′)} ·Qj (3)
Lemma 2 follows immediately from Eq. 2, 3 by adding these inequalities together.
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Eq. 3 is obvious by definition. We now prove Eq. 2. First recall the following result from [3].
Lemma CZ (Cai and Zhao [3])
EntryFee(F) ≥
1
4
∑
j∈[m]
Prt∼F{j 6∈ SOLD(t)} ·Qj
− C · RSPMξ(v,F).
Note that the righthand side of Eq. 2 and the righthand side of Lemma CZ have exactly the
same form, although their numerical values may be quite different. The key insight for proving Eq.
2 is to generalize Lemma CZ to a more relaxed setting: the Digital Goods, where the type profile t’s
distribution can be de-coupled from the distribution of the available sets {Si(t<i)}. We show that in
this setting, it becomes possible to compare the two entry fees EntryFee(F) and EntryFee(G). We
emphasize that we are not casting our original research problem in a new setting. Rather, we merely
embed F and G in this larger space where we will be able to find a connecting path between them for
the purpose of comparing their revenues under ASPEQ,δ. (For more information on Digital Goods,
see e.g. Hartline and Karlin [11].)
In what follows, v and F are fixed, while Q, δ, ξ are determined by v, F (as specified in [3]).
Digital Goods (DG):
In this setting, each item j ∈ [m] has an unlimited supply of identical copies, so that j may be assigned
to many buyers if necessary. Let I = (I1, . . . ,In) where each Ii is a distribution over 2
[m]. Consider
the following mechanism: given a type profile t = (t1, . . . , tn), the seller generates for each buyer i ∈ [n]
a random Ii ∼ Ii and applies ASPEQ,δ to buyer i with Ii as the available set of items. Thus, the buyer
pays an entry fee δi(Ii) (and the appropriate item prices) if the condition ui(ti, Ii) ≥ δi(Ii) is satisfied;
otherwise buyer i pays nothing and receives no items. For any I and type profile distribution H, let
EntryFee(H,I) denote the expected total entry fees collected when t ∼ H, that is,
EntryFee(H,I) =
∑
i∈[n]
Eti∼Hi [PrIi∼Ii{ui(ti, Ii) ≥ δi(Ii)} · δi(Ii)] .
Definition [Embedding of H in DG Space] For any type profile distribution H, let IH = (IH1 , . . . ,I
H
n )
where each IHi is {Si(t<i) | t ∼ H}. It is obvious that H → (H,I
H) is an embedding that preserves
Entryfee, that is,
EntryFee(H) = EntryFee(H,IH).
We state below the embeddings of our targeted distributions F , G for easy reference.
Fact 1 EntryFee(F) = EntryFee(F ,IF ) where IFi is {Si(t<i) | t ∼ F},
EntryFee(G) = EntryFee(G,IG) where IGi is {Si(t
′
<i) | t
′ ∼ G}.
Fact 1 suggests that, EntryFee(F) and EntryFee(G) may be compared in the DG space via a
connecting point between (F ,IF ) and (G,IG), such as (F ,IG). This turns out to be indeed the case
as seen below.
Lemma 3 [Monotonicity] For any I and G v F ,
EntryFee(G,I) ≥ EntryFee(F ,I).
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Lemma 4 [Digital Goods Extension of CZ Lemma] For any I,
EntryFee(F ,I) ≥
1
4
∑
j∈[m]
Bj ·Qj − C · RSPMξ(v,F)
where Bj = mini∈[n] [PrIi∼Ii{j ∈ Ii}].
Proof of Lemma 3. Write t′i ≥v ti if v(t
′
i, S) ≥ v(ti, S) for all S ⊆ [m]. By definition of v-domination,
one can generate a random pair of types (t′i, ti) such that (a) t
′
i ≥v ti, and (b) marginal distribution of
t′i, ti equals Gi, Fi respectively. Noting that ui(t
′
i, Ii) ≥ ui(ti, Ii) whenever t
′
i ≥v ti, we have
EntryFee(G,I) =
∑
i∈[n]
Et′
i
∼Gi
[
PrIi∼Ii{ui(t
′
i, Ii) ≥ δi(Ii)} · δi(Ii)
]
≥
∑
i∈[n]
Eti∼Fi [PrIi∼Ii{ui(ti, Ii) ≥ δi(Ii)} · δi(Ii)]
= EntryFee(F ,I)
Proof of Lemma 4. This requires a lengthy and complex proof. Fortunately, the proof of Lemma CZ as
given in [3] (in the arXiv full paper version, Lemma 31-34) can be extended line-by-line to our Digital
Goods Setting with minimum (and obvious) modifications to yield the present lemma, and hence will
not be repeated here.
Fact 2 For Ii = {Si(t
′
<i) | t
′ ∼ G}, we have
Bj ≥ Prt′∼G{j 6∈ SOLD(t
′)}.
Proof. Obvious.
It follows from Fact 1 and Lemma 3 that
EntryFee(G) ≥ EntryFee(F ,I)
where Ii = {Si(t
′
<i) | t
′ ∼ G}.
By Fact 2 and Lemma 4, we have then
EntryFee(G) ≥
1
4
∑
j∈[m]
Prt′∼G{j 6∈ SOLD(t
′)} ·Qj
− C ·RSPMξ(v,F).
This proves Eq. 2 and thus Lemma 2. We have completed the proof of Theorem 3.
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